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RES JUDICATA: PRIOR ADJUDICATION OF NEGLIGENCE
BARS RELITIGATION OF THAT ISSUE BY
DEFENDANT TO FORMER ACTION
Applying state substantive law, the Fourth Circuit held that a
prior adjudication of negligence in an action brought against the
present plaintiff was res judicata, even though defendant was not
a party to the former action. The court discarded the mutuality
rule and denied relitigation on the ground of effecting the policy
of res judicata without impairing the litigant's constitutional
right to a day in court, but failed to acknowledge the nature and
extent of its investigation of plaintiff's former defense.
THE RULE of mutuality, a traditional limitation on the doctrine of
res judicata,' has until relatively recent times2 maintained a re-
markably well-established position in the decisional law.3 The rule
requires that one who invokes the conclusive effect of a prior judg-
ment must have been either a party or in privity with a party4 to the
"Res judicata is a judicial policy which operates to preclude a matter which has
once been adjudicated from being litigated a second time. For critical analyses of
the doctrine and its policies, see generally Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE
LJ. 339 (1948); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957); Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness
of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REv. 301 (1961); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1942); Seavey, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither
Parties Nor Privies-Two California Cases, 57 HARv. L. Rav. 98 (1943); von Moschzisker,
Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299 (1929); Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv.
L. REv. 818 (1952).
OFor some of the earliest cases abandoning the mutuality requirement, see, e.g.,
Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 At. 260 (1934); Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. George Colon & Co., 260 N.Y. 305, 183 N.E. 506 (1932); Eagle, Star & British
Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
3 The mutuality rule is still applicable in numerous jurisdictions. E.g., Interstate
Elec. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 228 Ala. 210, 153 So. 427 (1934); Faber v. Van Zyl,
198 Iowa 1028, 200 N.W. 702 (1924); Wallace v. Goldberg, 72 Mont. 234, 231 Pac. 56
(1925); Taylor v. Barker, 70 Utah 534, 262 Pac. 266 (1927); Collins v. Treat, 108 W. Va.
443, 152 S.E. 205 (1930).
' "The word 'privy' includes those who control an action although not parties to it
(see § 84); those whose interests are represented by a party to the action (see §§ 85-88);
successors in interest to those having derivative claims (see §§ 89-92)." RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 83, comment a (1942).
The notion of privity in this connection has not been without criticism: "The ques-
tion of who is concluded by a judgment has been obscured by the use of the words
'privity' and 'privies,' which in their precise technical meaning in law, are scarcely
determinative always of who is and who is not bound by a judgment. Courts have
striven sometimes to give effect to the general doctrine that a judgment is only binding
between parties and privies, by extending the significance of the word 'privies' to
include relationships not originally embraced by it; whereas the true reason for hold-
ing the issue res judicata, does not necessarily depend on privity, but on the policy of
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action in which that judgment was rendered.5 Modern analyses,
however, have increasingly criticized the requirements of the rule
as lacking any "satisfactory rationalization."" In the recent case of
Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc.,7 the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals enhanced this trend of attenuation by discarding the mutuality
rule and holding that a judgment on an issue which was necessarily
determined in a prior suit may be asserted by a defendant in a sub-
sequent controversy, even though he was not a party to the prior suit
or in privity with a party.8
Graves was one of two personal injury suits which arose out of a
collision between an automobile driven by Graves and a truck driven
by Associated's employee. In the prior decision, which had been
rendered in a Virginia state court in an action brought by As-
sociated's employee against Graves, it had been determined that
Graves' negligence was the cause of the mishap.9 In the instant
federal court proceeding, brought by Graves against Associated,
law to end litigation .... " Taylor v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 40, 108 S.W. 1089,
1094 (1908), quoted in Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 183, 172 Atl. 260,
263-64 (1934).5 For an extensive discussion of the rule of mutuality see text accompanying notes
20-25 infra.6 Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122
P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
The mutuality rule has not been without its opponents historically. See BENTHAM,
Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 Woius oF JErEMY BENTHAM 171 (Bowring ed.
1843), a relevant excerpt of which is quoted in Currie, supra note 1, at 284 n.6.
See also, Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who Entitled to Plead, 9 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 241
(1923); Currie, supra note 1; Note, 41 VA. L. Rav. 404 (1955); 35 YArE L.J. 607 (1926).
7344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965).
8 The case was filed in a Virginia state court and removed to the federal court by
Associated, predicating jurisdiction upon diversity of citizenship. Under the doctrine
of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the court was bound to decide in ac-
cordance with the substantive law of Virginia. The parties having stipulated that there
was no Virginia authority squarely on point, however, disposal of the case was to
accord with what the court believed "would be decided by the highest court of Vir-
ginia, taking into account not merely the generalizations and the dicta in cases from
years past but also trends in modern legal thought which we think would be accepted
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia today." 44 F.2d at 896.
The court noted that the Supreme Court of Virginia had subscribed to the
mutuality rule in the most recent cases explicitly dealing with it. Id. at 897, citing
Ferebee v. Hungate, 192 Va. 32, 68 S.E.2d 761 (1951); Pittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191 Va.
886, 63 S.E.2d 34 (1951), appeal dismissed sub nom. Winn v. Pittston Co., 342 U.S. 803
(1951). The court listed subsequent cases involving res judicata which have been
adjudicated in Virginia and declared that these "have turned upon their individual
factual circumstances, with little or no discussion of the mutuality rule." 344 F.2d at
897 n.3.
9 344 F.2d at 896. Flowers, Associated's employee was awarded a jury verdict of
$2000 on a finding that Graves' negligence was the cause of the accident.
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the latter pleaded res judicata and relied upon the previous deter-
mination of fault.10 Although a res judicata assertion of the prior
judgment might have been predicated on the "employer-employee"
exception to the mutuality rule,1 the Court of Appeals chose to di-
verge from this traditional ground. Rather, the previous determina-
tion of the negligence issue was deemed controlling as a result of
the court's decision to reject the mutuality rule entirely.
In order to assess the viability of the rule of mutuality, its status as
a branch of the res judicata concept must be examined. The essence
of the doctrine of res judicata is the judicially formulated proposition
that a matter which has been adjudicated in a prior action cannot be
litigated a second time.12 The policies which res judicata is designed
to serve include the public interest in decreasing litigation, protection
of the individual from the harassment of having to litigate the same
cause of action 3 or issue against the same adversary or his privy more
than once, and facilitation of reliance on judgments. 4 The col-
lateral estoppel aspect of res judicata 5 provides that issues which
10 The federal action had been commenced prior to the state court proceeding, but
final judgment in the latter action preceded the federal determination.
11344 F.2d at 898.
One of the recognized exceptions to the mutuality rule is that it will not be ap-
plied in an action against an employer if the party bringing the action has previously
been unsuccessful in litigating the same issue against the employee. For a more
inclusive discussion of the exceptions to the rule see note 24 infra.
12 The doctrine is, of course, tempered by the requirement that justice be done in
the individual case. Thus it has been held not to apply where there are overriding
competing policies. Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35 (D.D.C. 1951) (preservation of at-
torney-client relationship); White v. Adler, 289 N.Y. 34, 43 N.E.2d 798 (1942) (indi-
vidual's protection from official misfeasance).
12 For a treatment of what constitutes a "cause of action," and the dissatisfaction
with definitions of the phrase, see Cleary, supra note 1, at 33942. Cleary takes note
of two divergent definitions of the term as formulated by the leading exponents of
rival schools of thought: "That group of operative facts which, standing alone, would
show a single right in the plaintiff and a single delict to that right giving cause for
the state, through its courts, to afford relief to the party or parties whose right was
invaded." McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614, 638 (1925), quoted
in Cleary, supra note 1, at 340. "'Such an aggregate of operative facts as will give rise to
at least one right of action, but it is not limited to a single right (if it is ever possible
to isolate one such right from others). The extent of the cause is to be determined
pragmatically by the court . . . but the controlling factor will be the matter of trial
convenience ...." CLARK, CODE PLEADING 137 (2d ed. 1947), quoted in Cleary, supra
note 1, at 340.
11 Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 308.
Some writers have stressed and criticized subsidiary policies which are also ef-
fected by res judicata. They include prevention of double recovery, inconsistent ver-
dicts and unstable decisions. E.g., discussions of these policies in Cleary, supra note 1;
Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 826-28 (1952).
15 Many state courts refer to collateral estoppel as "estoppel by judgment," but
this is technically improper. "The doctrine of estoppel is not strictly applicable to a
Vol. 1966: 283]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
have previously been litigated 16 and determined 17 by a valid and final
judgment 8 shall not be unnecessarily relitigated in any subsequent
action between the parties or their privies.' 9
judgment. A judgment is not the act of a party; an estoppel is." 2 FREEMAN, JUDG-
mENTs § 626 (5th ed. 1925).
See Scott, supra note 1, at 3 nn.4 & 5, for a discussion of how the term "collateral
estoppel" is used by the RESTAT MENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 45 (c), 47 (e), 68 (a) (1942).
"Actual litigation is a prerequisite to the application of collateral estoppel. This
requirement reflects the notion that the determination of an issue is not sufficiently
reliable to be used in a subsequent litigation unless that determination results from
the issue's having been submitted to the rigors of an adversary system. For example,
a default judgment generally should not be conclusive against a defendant in a sub-
sequent suit based on a different cause of action. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §
68 (f) (1942).
17 It is imperative in the second proceeding for the court to know that the issue
in question was by necessity determined in order to render the judgment in the prior
action. Thus, where findings are made but the judgment is not dependent on those
findings, they are not conclusive between the parties in the subsequent suit. RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (o) (1942). Further, where several issues are considered in the
prior action, if it does not appear from an investigation of that action that judgment
was based on a determination of the issue in question, the judgment is not conclusive in
the second action. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 1) (1942).
18 A judgment is final if no further action by the rendering court is necessary to
determine the matter litigated. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 41 (1942). For example,
interlocutory orders by themselves are not ordinarily considered final for res judicata
purposes. Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 835 (1952).
Authorities diverge on the question of whether a judgment pending appeal is final
in a subsequent suit. See, e.g., 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 722 (5th ed. 1925). For the
relevance of this point to Graves, see note 43 infra.
WAs used by the RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note, ch. 3 (1942), res
judicata is a term representing the conclusion that one of the following four rules
applies: merger, bar, direct estoppel or collateral estoppel. The use of merger and bar
in the RESTATEMENT is illustrated by one of the Reporters in Scott, supra note 1,
at 2: "A judgment has the effect of putting an end to the cause of action which was
the basis of the proceeding in which the judgment is given. If the judgment is
for the defendant and is on the merits, the cause of action is extinguished; that is,
the judgment operates as a bar. If the judgment is for the plaintiff, the cause of
action is extinguished but something new is added, namely, rights based on the
judgment; there is a merger of the cause of action in the judgment."
Direct estoppel operates only when an issue is actually litigated and determined.
In such a case the determination is conclusive in any subsequent action between the
parties based upon the same cause of action providdd that the plaintiff is not pre-
cluded from maintaining the subsequent action by extinguishment of his cause of
action under the rules as to merger and bar. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 45, comment
d (1942).
Collateral estoppel applies when the subsequent action is predicated on a different
cause of action. In such a situation the prior "judgment is conclusive between the
parties . . . as to questions actually litigated and determined by the judgment. It is
not conclusive as to questions which might have been but were not litigated [and
determined] in the original action." RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68, comment a (1942).
Merger, bar and direct estoppel are all concerned with successive suits between the
same parties on the same cause of action. "The term 'collateral' estoppel is intended to
emphasize the fact that the causes of action involved in the two proceedings are dif-
ferent, even though the issues or some of them are the same." Scott, supra note 1, at 3.
[Vol. 1966: 283
RES JUDICATA
The rule of mutuality20 has traditionally been applied in deciding
which persons are bound by the adjudication of an issue once it is
known that the issue was litigated and determined in a prior action.
Mutuality has been principally justified on the ground that it is
dictated by the requirements of due process.21 A fundamental prin-
ciple of due process is the assurance that a person who has not had a
fair opportunity to be heard on a question which affects his interests
should not be bound by an adjudication of that question.22 Within
the context of due process, therefore, collateral estoppel should not
be applied in such a way that the determination of an issue will
bind a party to a subsequent litigation who was not a party to the
action in which that determination was made.23  The rule of
mutuality effectuates the "fairness" dictates of due process by re-
quiring that unless both parties to the subsequent litigation
were also parties to the former action, or in privity with such
a party, the finality of the prior adjudication may not be as-
serted in the subsequent action.24 Thus mutuality has been deemed
2 0 The term "mutuality" derives from the expression that the estoppel of a judg-
ment must be mutual to be effective; that is, a party will not be bound by a prior
judgment unless he would have been bound by it had it gone the other way. See
Pittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 901, 63 S.E.2d 34, 42, appeal dismissed sub nom.
Winn v. Pittston Co., 342 U.S. 803 (1951).
21 For a case discussion of due process requirements in res judicata, see Hedlund v.
Miner, 395 Ill. 217, 230, 69 N.E.2d 862, 868 (1946). 89 U. PA. L. Rnv. 525 (1941); 27
VA. L. RFv. 396 (1941).
22 "It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one
is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated
as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process." Hans-
berry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the cir-
cumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
2' "This does not mean, however, that everyone must in fact have a day in court,
but only that the machinery must be provided so that a reasonable opportunity
to be heard will be afforded under normal circumstances." Seavey, supra note 1, at 99.
2 In order to keep the mutuality rule viable, the courts developed certain
exceptions in cases where its application would create an anomalous situation. Such
a situation may occur when a party to one action is in a position of indemnity to a
party in a subsequent action. Master-servant, principal-agent, employer-employee,
and derivative liability relationships are subsumed under this category. For example,
suppose that an indemnitor has recovered a judgment from a third party and that
the third party then brings an action against the indemnitee. If the indemnitee
is held liable to the third party, the court can either deny him his cause of action
against the indemnitor or allow him to recover from the indemnitor who has already
recovered a judgment in his favor. The first alternative is unjust; the second raises
the anomaly that the indemnitor will be held liable on an issue on which he has
already been adjudged free from fault. In order to avoid a choice between these un-
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requisite on the theory that since it is unfair to allow the prior de-
termination of an issue to be asserted against one not a party to the
prior proceeding, it is reciprocally unfair to allow the determination
to be asserted by one not a party to the prior proceedingY5
In so operating, however, the rule unduly exceeds the requisites
of due process since it fails to distinguish between the severable
questions of who may assert a prior judgment and against whom
it may be asserted.26 It was precisely this analytic shortcoming that
the Supreme Court of California seized upon in its noted judicial
assault on the mutuality rule in Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n.27 The Bernhard court posed the inquiry in terms
of whether the party who would be affected by a plea of res
judicata has already had a full and fair day in court on the
desirable alternatives, the courts have traditionally allowed the indemnitee to take
advantage of the indemnitor's prior victory by a plea of res judicata. It is important
to note, however, that the existence of the anomaly-the possibility of holding the
indemnitor liable to the indemnitee on an issue which has already been decided in
his favor-was the only reason for permitting the exceptions. Thus the indemnitce
presumably should not be allowed to use offensively a prior judgment and the in-
demnitor should never be allowed to use a judgment obtained by the indemnitee,
since in neither situation can the anomaly arise. See, e.g., Good Health Dairy
Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937) (derivative liability ex-
ception); City of Richmond v. Davis, 135 Va. 319, 116 S.E. 492 (1923) (indemnitor-
indemnitee exception).
The Graves case itself, as the court noted, presents a situation where application of
the employer-employee exception would be proper. It has been suggested, however,
that to include the employer-employee relationship among the exceptions is slightly
unrealistic since actions for indemnity by the employer against the employee are un-
likely. "Perhaps a solution for this branch of the problem would be facilitated if the
courts were to take candid account of the insurance factor." Currie, Mutuality of Col-
lateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, 806 n.58 (1957).
21"If the rule is a curious one, the reason given for it is even more so:-'Nobody
can take benefit by a verdict, who had not been prejudiced by it, had it gone con-
trary': a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the gambling
table to the bench. If a party be benefited by one throw of the dice he will, if the
rules of fair play are observed, be prejudiced by another; but that the consequence
should hold when applied to justice is not equally clear." Bentham, supra note 6,
quoted in 35 YArE L.J. 607, 609 n.11 (1926).
26 See Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122
P.2d 892 (1942). See also cases cited in note 2 supra.
27 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). In Bernhard, testatrix's administratrix sued
the bank for money paid to a former executor. The bank was allowed to rely
conclusively on a prior judgment rendered by the probate court in which it had
been determined that the bank had properly paid the money to the executor in a suit
brought against the executor by the beneficiaries, one of whom was the administratrix.
The bank had not been a party to the prior litigation.
"No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of
mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action should be
precluded from asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound by it is
difficult to comprehend." Id. at 812, 122 P.2d at 895.
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issue. If such a hearing has been afforded, there is no reason
to allow the affected party to interpose against a different opponent
an issue which has already been adversely determined. 2  Hence
under the Bernhard criterion a plea of res judicata will be allowed
if the person against whom the plea is asserted was either a party or
in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. 29 Thus it is un-
necessary to determine whether the person asserting the plea was a
party to the former action, since that determination does not affect
the question of fairness.
The Bernhard decision, although receiving scant comment at
the time it was rendered, has not remained unapplauded. 0 Some
concern, however, was manifested over the effect which mechanical
application of Bernhard might have on the fairness requirement in
certain situations. One such situation arises when offensive use of a
prior judgment is allowed against a party who was a defendant in
the prior action.31 It has been suggested that in the realities of
litigation, the defendant in the prior action does not control the
time or place of the suit. Thus, he may not have had the oppor-
tunity to make an effective defense and, hence, may in fact have
been denied his full and fair day in court.32
28 19 Cal. 2d at 814, 122 P.2d at 896.
As well as transcending the requirements of due process, the mutuality rule con-
tains a logical fallacy in its statement that since a person would not have been bound
by the judgment had it gone the other way, he cannot take advantage of it as it is.
29 The Bernhard court asserted that the answers to three inquiries would be de-
terminative in any case where the plea of res judicata was invoked by way of col-
lateral estoppel: "Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with
the one presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the
merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication?" 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895 (1942).20 E.g., Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957).
31 Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958); Currie, Mutuality
of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 316
(1957). Professor Currie subsequently retracted this reservation in Currie, Civil Pro-
cedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALiF. L. Rxv. 25, 28-29 (1965).
"Another of Professor Currie's objections stemmed from his concern over the
problem of a mass disaster, where a defendant would be faced with multiple
claimants. Following the prescripts of Bernhard a judgment for any plaintiff would
be conclusive against the defendant in all subsequent actions, whereas no judgment
for the defendant would be conclusive against any plaintiff in a subsequent suit.
Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.
L. REv. 281, 289-94 (1957). This precise situation arose in United States v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962), where, following the Bernhard rule,
the District Court of Nevada held that a prior California adjudication estopped the
airline from relitigating the issue of negligence. For a thorough discussion, see 1964
DuaK L.J. 402. In this situation also Professor Currie withdrew his reservations.
Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews. 53 CALiF. L. Rav. 25, 32 (1965).
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In the absence of the mutuality rule, a judgment will be binding
on a party in all future actions involving the same issues. A second
objection to the Bernhard rationale was based on the observation
that for practical purposes, a defendant is forced to fight every issue
in order to avoid an adverse judgment.33 This, it has been argued,
is unduly harsh.34 It is to be noted that the mutuality rule, perhaps
fortuitously, precluded both of these alleged iniquities from arising.
In those cases in which the mutuality rule has been rejected, how-
ever, the courts have in each case inquired into the question of fair-
ness by assessing the party's opportunity to litigate the issues in the
former action.35 Thus in each of the qualifying situations mentioned
the courts have taken an ad hoc approach in examining the realities
of a former defense to determine whether the defendant's full and
fair day in court was affected.
In Graves, the Fourth Circuit rejected the mutuality rule on the
basis of the trend of the substantive law of Virginia3 6 and adopted
the reasoning of the Bernhard case.37 In addition, the court alluded
33 Moore & Currier, supra note 1, at 309.
3, Ibid.
Without the limiting force of the mutuality rule, a litigant who would otherwise
be willing to suffer a default judgment because of the "comparative insignificance
of the claim and the costliness of full and thorough litigation" cannot reasonably
do so since the judgment will be binding on him as to the issues litigated in all future
suits no matter how unforeseeable. Id. at 309. "Danger arises when the possibility
of subsequent litigation involving identical issues is so remote at the time of the first
suit that the party may not have litigated all issues fully; especially is this true when
the stake in the first suit was not great, and the stake in the second suit is dispro-
portionately larger." Id. at 809 n.22.
In response to this objection it has been suggested that to prevent the plea of res
judicata in situations where the defendant merely chooses not to press a particular
defense depending on the stakes in the action or for "strategic reasons relating
to other cases which may be brought against him" merely "allows the defendant to
trifle with law administration." Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of
the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. Rav. 281, 303 (1957).
- Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1964); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc.
v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 607, 375 P.2d 439, 441, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561
(1962) ("he had every motive to make as vigorous and effective a defense as possible').
Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L.
REv. 281, 308-22 (1957).
36 See note 8 supra.
37 344 F.2d at 900.
It is interesting to note that both the Bernhard and Graves decisions laid emphasis
on an earlier Virginia decision rendered in Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v.
Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927). This case allowed the use of an earlier
criminal conviction in a subsequent suit. Since a criminal conviction represents a
conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt, a stricter standard than is required in a civil
case, it is generally considered that criminal convictions should have res judicata effect
in a subsequent suit, but that criminal acquittals for the same reason should not.
See Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. Rav. 820, 874-80 (1952).
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to the necessity of making an inquiry into the circumstances of the
fairness of the previous action on a case-by-case basis.
The plaintiff in Graves alleged that to allow a plea of res judicata
in the instant case would transgress the requirements of fairness due
to special circumstances involved. It was contended, first, that As-
sociated's plea in bar should be denied because Graves was not
represented in the federal court by the same counsel as in the state
court proceeding. This, however, was not deemed so prejudicial as
to compel the court to allow relitigation. The court dismissed the
contention as specious in view of Graves' failure to allege that
his counsel in the former action lacked either competence or dili-
gence.38 The opinion further noted that a mere change in counsel
did not indicate that "the plaintiff had anything other than a full
and fair chance to present all the relevant evidence and be heard
on all points of law" in the prior action.39 This summary disposi-
tion of the plaintiff's argument is somewhat troublesome in light
of the fact that by rejecting the mutuality rule the court has ex-
plicitly imposed upon itself the duty to make a factual investiga-
tion into the adequacy of Graves' former defense. The court was
silent on the question of whether the motive of Graves to make a
good defense was in this connection relevant to a rejection of the
argument that a prior defense was inadequate. Graves, in the state
court action, had been represented by his insurance carrier's counsel.
In cases involving small claims it is quite conceivable that the in-
surance company might not put forth its best efforts. Here, although
the prior judgment against Graves had been only $2000, Associated's
employee had claimed $50,000. This would seem to be a sufficiently
substantial claim to warrant the insurance company's putting forth
its best defense. Unfortunately, there is no indication in the
court's language that such an examination of these indicia was made.
It would seem that in cases which formerly brought mutuality into
play attention should be given to the factual realities influencing a
party's motive to defend, especially in the situation where the claim
is small and the insured is required by contract to be represented
by his insurer's counsel.40
For a concise case discussion see Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.
2d 601, 375 P.2d 439, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962) (criminal conviction given res judicata
effect in subsequent suit to recover on insurance contract).
38 344 F.2d at 901.
31 Ibid.
0 In this connection it might also be relevant to inquire into the right of appeal
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Graves also contended that res judicata worked injustice in his
case because the federal court action in which he was plaintiff had
been commenced prior to the state court action. In considering this
argument, the court stated that there was nothing unfair in the
policy of determining the binding date of an adjudication as the date
judgment is rendered rather than the time an action is commenced. 41
The Graves court rationalized this conclusion by a general reaffirma-
tion of res judicata rather than inquiring into the particulars of im-
mediate justice. Noting that there is "an element of the arbitrary
and fortuitous . . . in the basic idea of res judicata," the court
deemed the policy well-justified per se in that it prevented numerous
untimely and ill-considered actions from being commenced.42 Again,
the Fourth Circuit appears remiss in failing to relate this policy
to the facts of Graves by explicit analysis designed to show that
Graves was subjected to no unfairness by the res judicata effect given
the prior judgment. 43
of the party in the former action. If there is no appeal of right, this may be an addi-
tional factor motivating the party to litigate fully. In Graves, there was no appeal
of right under VA. CODE ANN. § 8-462 (1957). "A writ of error and supersedeas in this
case was refused by the Supreme Court of Appeals on January 18, 1965." 344 F.2d at
896 n.1. On the other hand, the lack of an appeal of right would seem especially
deserving of court attention in Graves since it tends to magnify the possible prejudice
inherent in an alleged inadequacy of counsel.
1 344 F.2d at 901.
'
2 Ibid.
It would seem that if Graves feared a prejudicial effect from the state court action,
he might have petitioned for a stay of proceedings in the state court, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-462 (1957), until the federal court had rendered judgment.
The opinion does not state whether Flowers, Associated's employee, was a resident
of Virginia. If he was not, Graves might have removed the state court proceeding
to the federal court on diversity grounds. Graves could then invoke FED. R. Civ. P.
42 (a) and consolidate both actions in the federal court. Either of these courses of
action would have resolved any prejudicial effect of prior adjudication in the state
court action that Graves may have wished to avoid. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTs
§ 68 (t) (1942).
It is also significant to note that the state court judgment was pending appeal
when the lower federal court rendered its decision. 344 F.2d at 895, 896 n.l. Whether
this fact might affect the applicability of a plea of res judicata was not discussed in
the Graves opinion since the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had refused a writ
of error before the Fourth Circuit rendered its decision. A majority of jurisdictions
which have considered the point have held that the pendency of an appeal does not
invalidate the res judicata effect of a judgment. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 984 (1950).
The cases distinguish between the subject matter of appeals, generally holding that in
the situation where an appeal is limited to a review of the record of the lower court,
the prior judgment will be considered final for res judicata purposes. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., 297 Fed. 580, 583 (4th Cir. 1924).
The objection to the rule under which the pendency of an appeal prevents a
judgment from operating as res judicata is that it enables one against whom a judg-
ment is entered to avoid its force for a considerable period of time merely by taking
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It may seem that in the absence of the mutuality rule the alterna-
tive "fairness" approach is not totally satisfying in view of the diffi
cult inquiries which this approach necessitates. 441 In the last
analysis, however, approval or disapproval of the result adopted
in Graves must rest in one's confidence in the ability and willing-
ness of the courts to make this kind of investigation. Although the
Fourth Circuit did not satisfactorily specify its investigatory, pro-
cesses in Graves, the ultimate result would indicate that it has met
the task.
an appeal. The objection to the opposing rule is that even though the judgment, if
erroneous, will be reversed, it is the causal factor of another judgment from which
obtaining relief may be impossible. Federal courts will reopen second judgments in
such situations. F.D. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (6). By weighing these arguments solely with
regard to fairness it would seem that the judgment pending appeal should not have
res judicata effect, especially in light of the facts that the time for appeal is limited
and that there is great potential danger in holding the pending decision as res judicata.
The best solution, it has been suggested, is a stay in the proceedings of the second
suit until the appellate decision is rendered. See 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 722 (5th ed.
1925).
"E.g., detecting compromise jury verdicts and appraising the quality of counsel
for the defense. See United States v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 709, 730-31
(D. Nev. 1962). For a case where a compromise verdict was suspected by the court see
Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal. 2d 462, 468, 247 P.2d 324, 328 (1952). In that case, the
plaintiff sought a new trial limited to the issue of damages. The Supreme Court of
California denied the request, as the issue of liability had been a close one and the
court feared the prejudicial effect which any new trial would have on the defendant.
